The Necessity and Insufficiency of Human Rights

Correa and Thomas both observe the indispensability and insufficiency of human rights. They appreciate the necessity of human rights whilst reminding us to remain critical of them. Human rights rely on a false sense of universality, without which they would not be able to exist. Yet this universality leads to an inability to factor in cultural, individual and group differences.

A critical question in regards to human rights is: "who gets to make them and how can they avoid ethnocentrism?"

Nikki Sullivan explores the white optics behind the western view of 'female genital mutilation (FGM)'. Comparing this practice with cosmetic genital surgery in the west, ethnocentric bias in perspectives on morality become clear.

The above video brings to attention the issues that human rights are built around. Human rights are not fulfilled worldwide. It can be seen that the more injustices there are in the world, the more human rights are needed. In this sense, to an extent, human rights reflect the amount of injustice there is in the world.

Finally, Thomas leaves us with the question: "who counts as human?"

References:

Corrêa, S, Petchesky, R & Parker, R 2008, “On the indispensability and insufficiency of human rights” in Sexuality, Health and Human Rights, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 151-163.

Thomas, K 2006, “Afterword: Are Transgender Rights Inhuman Rights?” in P. Currah, R. M. Juang, S Price Minter (eds) Transgender Rights, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 310-326.

Sullivan, N 2007. ‘“The Price to Pay for our Common Good”: Genital Modification and the Somatechnologies of Cultural (In)Difference’, Social Semiotics, 17:3, pp. 395-409.

Intersections of Race and Sexuality

In his article "I Think You're the Smartest Race I've Ever Met: Racialised Economies of Queer Male Desire", Alan Han develops a concept of desire as capital. In this economy of desire, he explores the way queer Asian men are racialised, whereas queer white men possess whiteness which means they also possess the invisible standard of desirability.

When Han says "...whilst campaigning for queer rights, I realized that the rights I was fighting for were those of queer white men", he problematises the way campaigns often ignore intersections, leading to exclusions and prejudices against certain groups of people. This is similar to how feminist activism is often white feminist activism, or women-only feminist activism.

In response to his question "What do queer white men gain from refusing to desire queer Asian men?" it would seem that it is a matter of othering queer Asian men in order to reinforce queer white men's white supremacy. However, as Han mentions that people don't "consciously choose their desires", I think it is important to look at the relations of power involved in the experiences of both queer white men and queer Asian men, taking into account that queer Asian men are also actors on the playing field where queer white men are more desirable to all queer men.

Reference:

Han, A 2006, ‘I Think You’re the Smartest Race I’ve Ever Met: Racialised Economies of Queer Male Desire’, Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association e-Journal, vol.2, no.2, pp.1-14.

Law and Justice

Derrida argues that law and justice are not the same. Caputo describes justice as being fairness, and the fact that this fairness isn't present in law demonstrates the difference between the two. The law tries to be just, he says, but it falls short of justice, unable to account for each individual situation. This difference between law and justice can be seen in the way the law is often biased against certain groups of people or individuals.
 

From 2010 to 2014, Norrie May-Welby fought for the legal status of being neither man nor woman. In April 2014, the high court ruled that a third gender must be recognised in NSW. The language that was used in court was scattered with assumptions of a sex binary. These assumptions are not fair on those who are outside this sex binary. When the foundations that a law is made on are unjust, then justice and law cannot be the same. However, in the case of Norrie May-Welby we can also see the way justice works to improve the law. Instead of seeing law as justice, we can see justice as being an influence on law.

Yet if it is impossible for the law to account for the individual, then can the law ever be just? And even when the law changes to become more just, is it really any more just than before when the language used is itself unjust?


J. Caputo, “In the names of Justice” in Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with constant Reference to Deconstruction, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 69-92.

J. Derrida, “Froce of Law: ‘The Mystical foundation of authority”, trans. P.M. Quaintance, In D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York and London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 3-67

http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/s273-2013/Norrie_App.pdf

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/third-gender-must-be-recognised-by-nsw-after-norrie-wins-legal-battle

Interlocking Systems of Domination

In her article, Bell Hooks criticises the feminist movement for placing the problem of patriarchal dominance above problems of racism and other forms of domination. Hooks reminds us that "women can and do participate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims" (1989, p. 19) and that oppressed and oppressor can and do share the same race, class and/or sex. This reminds me of Foucault's theory of power. Foucault describes power as a "mobile field of force relations" (1978, p. 102), meaning that power isn't static. It also means that power cannot be possessed by a person or an institution, rather, power is a force relationship between people and institutions. Hooks speaks of the importance of "interlocking systems of domination" wherein more than one relation of power may be in effect. She emphasizes the importance to take class and race into account when focusing on patriarchal domination. Without considering interlocking systems of domination, we may just end up with a racist cause to end patriarchal domination, or a sexist cause to end racism. I suggest that what we need is an all encompassing cause to end oppression.

Hooks, B. 1989,  ‘Feminism: A Transformational Politic’, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black, South End Press Boston MA, pp. 19-27.

M. Foucault, “Method” in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. R. Hurley, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978, pp. 92-102.

Questioning Gender Dimorphism

Judith Butler questions the necessity of sex reassignment surgery in intersex infants. She describes the falsity of gender dimorphism and the biological chromosomal continuum between male and female in infants. Butler thereby demonstrates how "gender dimorphism as a prerequisite of human development" is arbitrary. Intersex babies need not undergo what is often medically, and, arguably, socially, unnecessary surgery in order to fit into a defined gender role which they may find problematic.

In another example of problematising gender dimorphism, Patricia Elliot discusses incidents where transgender people have been denied membership to women's groups because they ostensibly pose a threat to feminist or female identity. I suggest that such feminists might consider taking on the challenges raised by this discussion in order to create an inclusive movement to address equality for all genders and not only equality for women.

In the following video, transman activist, Yee Won Chong reminds us of the common conflation of assigned sex, gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation. He separates them into continua illustrating these differences with his own personal experience. Chong's talk is useful to help people understand the reality and depth of the problems that transgender people experience on a day to day basis.

Butler, J 2004, ‘Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Allegories of Transsexuality’, in Undoing Gender, Routledge, New York, pp. 74-101.

Elliott, P, 2010, 'Ch 1: Feminist embattlement on the field of trans', Debates in Transgender, Queer and Feminist Theory', Ashgate, Farnham & Burlington, pp. 17-31.

Chong, YW 2012, Beyond the Gender Binary: Yee Won Chong at TEDxRainier, online video, 13 December, TEDx Talks, viewed 11 May 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Lm4vxZrAig>.

Female Genital Modification

In '"The Price to Pay for our Common Good": Genital Modification and the Somatechnologies of Cultural (In)Difference', Nikki Sullivan draws attention to the biased 'white optics' that form our perceptions of Female Genital Modification (FGM) in Australia. In this video from the ABC, the focus is on surgery performed on children without consent, by women who lack medical training.

It is important to address incidences of FGM without consent, such as those presented in the video. However, the question remains as to why it is still illegal for a consenting adult to undergo FGM? Why are other forms of genital surgery widely accepted, yet so called 'Female Genital Mutilation' positioned as deviant?

Sullivan describes FGM as "a Eurocentric discursive construct that emerged in a particular time and place and in accordance with specific ways of seeing, knowing and being... a bio-political technology; one that establishes and polices boundaries and borders between "us" and "them", between proper and improper bodies - both individual and social - and evaluate their worth in terms that replicate the civilising presumptions of the past, silence subjugated knowledges, and pathologise difference." (2007, p. 400)

FGM is often described in terms of 'mutilation' and 'barbarism' (as can be seen in the ABC video), while cosmetic genital surgery is promoted, reinforcing ideologies of what is normal. Who are we to pass ethnocentric judgement on women who want to undergo surgery to live up to cultural expectations? The same happens here in Australia, accepted and normalised under the title of cosmetic surgery. 

Wounded Attachments: Israel and Palestine

Friedrich Nietzsche describes ressentiment as an individual's blaming of their own oppressed position on an external body or force. Characterised by feelings of resentment and inferiority, ressentiment justifies the individual's actions against the perceived oppressor.

Wendy Brown ascribes ressentiment to oppressed groups. In explaining wounded attachments Brown suggests that “politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future—for itself or others—that triumphs over this pain” (Brown 1995, 74).

In his essay, Yoav Litvin utilizes neuroscience, psychology and personal reflection to discuss the Israel Palestine conflict in regards to fear experienced on both sides. He suggests breaking down stereotyped conceptions of the oppressor and the oppressed through nonviolent exposure to the other. Parallels can be drawn between this and Brown's model of 'wounded attachments', wherein both suggest that attachment to pain prevents healing.

Here is a critical/humorous take on the conflict:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3by9FoEFB8

Reference List:

W. Brown, “Wounded Attachments” in States of Injury, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 52-76.

F. Nietzsche, from Beyond Good and Evil, in D. Ravitch and A. Thernstrom (eds) The Democracy Reader: Classic and Modern Speeches, Essay, Poems, Declarations and Documents on Freedom and Human Rights Worldwide, New York, Harper Perennial, 1992, pp. 77-79.

Litvin, Y 2013, Accountability and Healing in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, Shomer Shalom: Network for Jewish Nonviolence, viewed 4 May 2014,
<http://shomershalom.org/2013/08/21/never-give-up-nonviolent-civilian-resistance-healing-and-active-hope-in-the-holyland/>.